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There are surely more types of authoritarian regimes than of democra-
cies, even though the latter absorb so much of our scholarly attention. 
Authoritarian systems have been with us longer, have ruled more people, 
and for all we know may rule more people in the future than democratic 
systems. This should not be surprising if one considers that authoritari-
anism is the residual category of a type of regime that is narrowly de-
fined (free political competition for the highest positions of real power), 
historically new, and often unconsolidated—namely, democracy. As a 
residual category, authoritarianism is inevitably vast and encompasses 
many different subtypes of regimes.1 
The questions of how such regimes stay in power and how they change 
used to engage students of totalitarianism, corporatism, military rule, bu-
reaucratic authoritarianism, and comparative communism. But these top-
ics went out of fashion in the early 1990s with what seemed to be the 
historic victory of democracy. To be sure, the Chinese regime was still in 
place, but it appeared to be liberalizing; smaller communist states were 
anomalies; and monarchies and theocracies appeared to be withering. 
But history retained its cunning—not the Hegelian kind that works 
its teleological way through blind human action, but the postmodern 
kind that responds to our interpretations with an ironic turn of events. 
Twenty years after Tiananmen, the resilience of Chinese authoritarian-
ism still surprises us. After inquiring into the prospects for Chinese de-
mocracy in 1998 and 2003, the Journal of Democracy decided to take 
stock once again.2 We considered whether the prospects for the regime 
have changed because of rapid economic growth and polarization, social 
turbulence, a rising middle class, and the new freedom of the Internet. 
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If not for limits of space, we could also have asked about the impacts 
of Western education and culture, environmental degradation, political 
corruption, Han nationalism, ethnic-minority nationalism, the global 
economic crisis, and other giant forces that relentlessly test the overall 
framework of Chinese public order. 
The contributions in the preceding pages enrich our understanding of 
the Chinese system as an authoritarianism of a still poorly understood 
new type, one that mixes statism with entrepreneurship, political mo-
nopoly with individual liberty, personalist power with legal procedure, 
repression with responsiveness, policy uniformity with decentralized 
flexibility, and message control with a media circus. The system has re-
mained vigorous for twenty years not by stifling change but by fostering 
it, not by remaining institutionally static but by shaping Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP) ideology and state structures to meet new needs. 
The system today promotes competent leaders, carries out political suc-
cession in an orderly way, generates effective public policies, and re-
cruits popular support. Perhaps the study of its dynamics will help spark 
a revival in the analysis of comparative authoritarian systems.
The Shadow of the Future
But like all contemporary nondemocratic systems, the Chinese sys-
tem suffers from a birth defect that it cannot cure: the fact that an al-
ternative form of government is by common consent more legitimate. 
Even though the regime claims to be a Chinese form of democracy on 
the grounds that it serves the people and rules in their interest, and even 
though a majority of Chinese citizens today accept that claim,3 the re-
gime admits, and everyone knows, that its authority has never been sub-
ject to popular review and is never intended to be. In that sense, the 
regime is branded as an expedient, something temporary and transitional 
needed to meet the exigencies of the time.4 Democratic regimes, by con-
trast, often elicit disappointment and frustration, but they confront no 
rival form that outshines them in prestige.5 Authoritarian regimes in this 
sense are not forever. For all their diversity and longevity, they live 
under the shadow of the future, vulnerable to existential challenges that 
mature democratic systems do not face. 
We have been used to dramatic, bright-line transitions to democracy. 
Might the Chinese system instead reform and adapt, adapt and reform, to 
the point where it emerges on the other side of the looking glass as more 
democratic than not? This is the hope of China’s rights-protection (wei-
quan) movement of lawyers, petitioners, bloggers, and journalists, and 
of the wider circle of civil society organizations and religious groups 
that have so far kept a low profile in order to avoid repression. They 
hope that the regime will become enmeshed in the logic of the institu-
tions that it has created as safety valves to preserve its rule, such as 
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courts and the media. The Party would then find itself forced to coexist 
with an equally powerful civil society, and China would have become a 
democracy without a dramatic moment of change. Call it a new type of 
transition —not breakdown, extrication, or pact, but segue. 
The Party resists this scenario. The key lesson that its leaders learned 
from Tiananmen was to refuse equal dialogue with society. As the pro-
crackdown premier Li Peng put it during his debates with the pro-dialogue 
Party secretary Zhao Ziyang during the crisis, to allow the demonstrating 
students to “negotiate with the Party and government as equals” would 
be to “negate the leadership of the CCP and negate the entire social-
ist system.”6 Subsequent events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
confirmed that point for the leadership.7 The regime is willing to change 
in any way that helps it to stay in power, but is unwilling to relax the ban 
on autonomous political forces. This makes it more likely that regime 
change, should it come, will occur through some kind of rupture.
But China’s transition will not resemble the Soviet Union’s. China is 
not in an arms race that it cannot afford. It is not overextended in a security 
rivalry with the United States. Its minority populations are only 5 or 6 per-
cent of its demographic makeup, not more than half. It is not constitution-
ally structured as a federation whose units have the right to secede.
Nor will the Chinese transition resemble Taiwan’s.8 The Chinese 
government does not need to integrate a previously excluded ethnic ma-
jority. It has not permitted the formation of an organized opposition 
or trained the populace in competitive elections. The country is not a 
dependency of the United States.
The most likely form of transition for China therefore remains the 
model of Tiananmen, with three elements coming together: 1) a robust 
plurality of disaffected citizens (in 1989 because of inflation and corrup-
tion, in the future possibly because of unemployment, an environmental 
disaster, or some form of national humiliation); 2) a catalytic event that 
sends a signal to scattered social forces that the time has come to rise up; 
and 3) a split in the leadership (whether due to personality differences, 
power struggle, uncertain support of the armed police and military, or 
ideological division) that renders the response from the top uncertain or 
weak and allows the challenge to snowball.
That the regime considers itself vulnerable to just such a scenario is 
evidenced by the massive efforts that it makes to prevent these three ele-
ments from emerging. It seeks to shield the public from the impacts of 
economic instability, buy legitimacy among major social sectors, con-
trol bad news, outlaw mobilization, divide and repress opposition, moni-
tor civil society, control networking tools such as the Internet and cell-
phones, strengthen the police and paramilitary, and above all, to keep 
its own internal divisions out of the public eye so that the opportunity 
structure for social mobilization remains unpromising.
Such efforts have succeeded so far in dealing with the impact of the 
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global economic crisis on Chinese workers. Dispersed back to the coun-
tryside from which they came and given work generated by the gov-
ernment’s stimulus package, the peasant workers have not mounted a 
challenge to the government. And the regime has succeeded in bottling 
up Charter 08, the most broadly based and intellectually sophisticated 
challenge to its principles of rule since Tiananmen itself. 
But the elements of potential crisis can come together at any time. 
If one imagines the Chinese system facing the kinds of problems that 
such countries as the United States, Britain, and Japan have recently 
gone through—unsuccessful wars, plummeting economies, unpopular 
leaders, hypercritical media, deep divisions over cultural identity—it is 
as hard to imagine the Chinese system surviving as it is to imagine the 
mature democracies collapsing. What keeps such crises of government 
from becoming crises of the regime are cultures of open dissent, the 
robust rule of law, and the institutional capacity to change leaders in 
response to public discontent without changing the system. Had China 
chosen the other path in 1989, it might have these stabilizing features 
today. Without them, the authoritarian regime must perform constantly 
like a team of acrobats on a high wire, staving off all crises while keep-
ing its act flawlessly together. Today, on the evidence of our contribu-
tors, the regime is managing to do that. But it cannot afford to slip.
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